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Abstract 
This research aims to analyse the impact of family ownership on company 
performance in Indonesia. The sample used in this research is 43 banks listed on 
Indonesia Stock Exchange in three years, starts from 2016 – 2018. Therefore, there 
are 129 observations. This research test one independent variable, one dependent 
variable and three control variables. Hypothesis testing is using multiple regression 
analysis. The result shows Family Ownership has negative effect towards Company 
Performance. The control variable ROA have a significant positive effect on 
Company Performance. The control variable CAR have a significant negative effect 
on Company Performance. The control variable LDR have a positive and 
insignificant effect on Company Performance.  
Keywords: company performance, family ownership, return on equity, return on 







1.1. Research Background 
In the Southeast Asia Region, more than two-thirds of companies are family or 
individual-controlled companies (Lang and Stulz, 2002). According to the Institute 
for Corporate and Directorship (IICD) in 2010 showed that more than 95% of 
businesses in Indonesia are companies owned or controlled by families 
(Soerjonodibroto, 2010). Companies with family ownership are established by two 
or more people who are members of the board of directors, are divided from the 
same name, and are shareholders in the company and are consistent with the 
family's previous business (Chang and Shim, 2015). The shareholder family has an 
interest in minimizing conflicts of interest and managing the company to create 
value for the company. When families still have a relationship with the company 
for a long period, they have a long-term perspective that is more conducive to 
making results in value judgments for the company  (Sanjaya, 2013). 
Based on previous research, many family companies are growing rapidly 
because of the loyalty and high dedication of the family to the progress of the 
company. This great sense of ownership is one of the key factors in the 
advancement of family businesses (Komalasari and Nor, 2014). However according 
to the principal's conflict perspective, conflicts between family shareholders and 





(Young et al, 2008). Thus, controlling family members can be more concerned with 
family self-interest than the overall wealth of the firm. 
Reported by money.kompas.com, PT Bank Central Asia Tbk again won the 
best bank award in Indonesia and Asia for the fourth time at the Finance Asia 
Country Awards for Achievement 2019 in Hong Kong. Hartono brothers control 
BBCA shares through PT Dwimuria Investama Andalan. Dwimuria is recorded to 
have as much as 54,94% of the total BBCA outstanding shares at 24,66 billion 
shares as of the end of 2018 as reported by cnbcindonesia.com. 
This research uses data from all family companies in the banking sector in 
Indonesia stock exchange starting from 2016 – 2018, considering the existence of 
regulations concerning financial services authority regulation (POJK) number 56 / 
POJK.03 / 2016 about Commercial Bank Share Ownership and all the banks 
industry in Indonesia must follow the regulation. 
 
1.2. Research Problem 
This research is a modification of the previous research, which uses Family 
ownership as the independent variable, Company performance as dependent 
variable and some control variables such as Capital Adequacy Ratio, Return on 
Assets and Loan to Deposit Ratio. The research problem is  







1.3. Research Objectives 
This research aims to analyse empirically the effect of Family ownership on 
company performance of family-owned bank companies listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange in 2016 – 2018. 
 
1.4. Research Contributions 
 The results of this research are expected to provide benefits to various parties 
as follows: 
1. Theoretical Contributions 
The results of the research can provide additional information and insights 
as well as empirical evidence regarding the effect of family ownership with 
company performance and can be used for further research as a reference. 
The researcher also hopes that the results of this research can be used as 
generalizations on similar research using different objects. 
2. Practical Contributions 
The results of the research can make a practical contribution for the family-
owned bank companies listed on the IDX to be able to manage the 
performance of corporate companies both from the family ownership and 
company performance. The researcher also hopes that the results of the 
research can help investors, creditors, the government and the public in 







1.5. Research Structure 
In this research there will be 3 chapter consist of: 
CHAPTER 1            INTRODUCTION 
Consist of background of the research, research 
problems, research objectives, research contributions 
and the research structure. 
CHAPTER 2            THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Consist of the theoretical basis, previous research, 
explanation of definition, framework and hypothesis 
development 
CHAPTER 3             RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 Consist of the explanation of method, sample 
selection, number of samples, data sources, variables 
with definition and type, collecting data and analysis 
method. 
CHAPTER 4                   DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 Consist of sample selection, descriptive statistic, 
assumption testing, test of classical assumption, 
hypothesis testing and discussion. 
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION 





THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1. Agency Theory 
According to Suwardjono (2005), agency theory is the relationship between 
shareholders (principals) and managers (agents) in which agents act on behalf of 
and for the interests of principals and for their action’s agents receive certain 
rewards. The relationship is usually stated in the form of a contract. "Meanwhile, 
according to Jensen & Meckling (1976) in Ujiyantho & Scouts (2007), Agency 
theory is a relationship based on contracts that occurs between members in the 
company, namely principals (owners) and agents (agent) as the main actor. This 
cooperation contract contains agreements explaining that the management of the 
company must work optimally to give maximum satisfaction such as high profit to 
the owner (owner) Einsenhardt in Saigian (2011) states that agency theory uses 
three assumptions of human nature, namely: 
1. Humans are generally selfish, 
2. Humans have limited thinking about the perception of the future (bounded 
rationality), and 








2.2. Company Performance 
According to Mulyadi (2001) Performance is the success of personnel, teams, 
or organizational units in realizing strategic goals that have been set previously with 
expected behaviour. According to the Minister of Finance of the Republic of 
Indonesia based on Decree No. 740 / KMK. 00/1989 dated 28 June 1989, 
performance is an achievement achieved by the company during a certain period 
that reflects the level of health of the company. Performance measurement has the 
objective to measure business and management performance compared to the 
objectives of the company's objectives. According to the Ikatan Akuntan Indonesia 
(2009), information on company performance, especially profitability is needed to 
assess potential changes in economic resources that may be controlled in the future. 
 
2.3. Return on Equity 
According to Brigham and Houston (2010) ROE is the ratio of net to ordinary 
equity measures the rate of return on investment of ordinary shareholders. 
According to Tandelilin (2010) Return on Equity (ROE) generally calculated using 
performance measurements based on accounting and calculated as the company's 




2.4. Family Ownership 
A company can be said to be owned by a family if the family is controlling 





shareholder compared to other shareholders (Kamaliah, 2013). Family business is 
a company whose majority shareholder is a family, and the position of manager is 
controlled by family members and it is expected that the family's descendants will 
follow in their footsteps as managers (Rock, 1991). 
 
2.4.1. The Advantages of Family Ownership for the Company 
Anderson and Reeb (2003), and Burkart et al., (2002) observed that 
companies with more active involvement by family members tended to have better 
performance. Lubatkin et al., (2005) assert that a unique feature of a family 
company is the relationship between children and parents in business. In this 
connection, family members try to ensure that they have the right to allocate 
company property. Family managers want to be committed to creating 
organizational success above personal interests (Davis et al., 1997). The controlling 
family may also have the same incentives, power, and information to supervise 
managers. For example, representation of a controlling family can reduce the 
likelihood of managers to fulfil their personal interests (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
 
2.4.2. The Disadvantages of Family Ownership of the Company 
In nepotism, a family company may have a desire to provide family 
members with work satisfaction that is not available elsewhere. However, family 
members may not have sufficient qualifications to occupy the position. Because, 
family companies will prefer to place family members rather than choosing a 





company is followed by problems of self-control and nepotism, this is a very 
difficult thing for family managers to develop in the long run. For example, through 
participation in joint ventures, family managers will expand their networks to obtain 
social benefits such as status or prestige (Sanjaya, 2013). 
 
2.5. Previous Research Results 
Previous Research conducted by Bhatt and Bhattcharya in 2017 with the title 
of “Family Firms, Board Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from top 
Indian Firms” with the independent variable is Family ownership and board 
structure, and the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q with leverage, firm age, firm 
size, sales growth, asset tangibility, stock volatility as control variables and using 
multivariate regression method the results are there is negative effect of family 
board structure to the company performance compared with non-family board 
member, and Family management was not found to significantly affect company 
performance compared to professionally managed companies. 
But the previous research by Komalasari and Nor in 2014 with the title of 
“Pengaruh struktur kepemilkan keluarga, kepemimpinan dan perwakilan keluarga 
terhadap kinerja perusahaan.” With the independent variable are family 
ownership, leadership and family member and the dependent are Tobin’s Q and 
ROA, then leverage, company size and company age as control variables. The 
research uses multiple linear regression method, and the results are family company 





2.6. Hypothesis Development 
2.6.1. The Impact of Family Ownership on Company Performance 
Companies with majority share ownership owned by the family will tend to 
be controlled by the family of the owner of the company. Family ownership is 
closely related to company performance, where families have strong incentives to 
maximize company performance. Company performance can be measured using 
Return on Equity (ROE). Return on Equity (ROE) is the company's ability to 
generate profits with its own capital, so that there is ROE which mentions the 
profitability of its own capital (Sutrisno, 2000). One of the main reasons’ companies 
operate is to generate profits that are beneficial to shareholders, the measure used 
in achieving this reason is the high and low ROE figures that have been achieved. 
The higher ROE, the higher the company's ability to generate profits for 
shareholders.  
The results of previous studies conducted by Komalasari (2014) show that 
family ownership has a positive effect on company performance. However, Bhatt 
and Bhattcharya (2017) stated that family ownership has a negative effect on 
company performance. Therefore, the theory stated that family ownership affects 
the company performance hence the hypothesis proposed to be tested in this 
research are as follows: 









This research was conducted to examine the effect of family ownership on 
company performance with ROA, CAR and LDR as control variables in banking 
companies listed on the IDX. The research was conducted on 43 banks with a span 
of 3 years (2016 - 2018). Based on the results of the analysis carried out, it can be 
concluded that the variable of family ownership has a negative effect on company 
performance with ROA, CAR and LDR as control variables. This is presumably 
because family companies will prefer to place family members rather than choosing 
a professional party, so When a public company is followed by problems of self-
control and nepotism, this is a very difficult thing for family managers to develop 
in the long run.  
For the control variable ROA control variable has a significant positive effect 
on company performance (ROE). CAR control variable has a significant negative 
effect on Company performance (ROE). LDR control variable has a positive and 
insignificant effect on Company performance (ROE). 
 
5.2. Research Limitations and Advice 
 The control variable used to analyse the performance of banking companies 





can be used to assess company performance. Suggestions for future researchers are 
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List of Sample Companies 
2016 
No Name ROE ROA CAR LDR 
1 AGRO 7,31% 1,49% 23,68% 88,25% 
2 AGRS 0,85% 0,15% 17,17% 84,89% 
3 AMAR -5,98% -5,08% 125,65% 24,08% 
4 ARTO -25,17% -5,25% 22,87% 80,74% 
5 BABP 0,62% 0,11% 19,54% 77,20% 
6 BACA 7,82% 1,00% 20,64% 55,34% 
7 BBCA 20,50% 4,00% 22,90% 90,70% 
8 BBHI 2,11% 0,53% 21,73% 89,04% 
9 BBKP 13,19% 1,38% 15,03% 86,04% 
10 BBMD 6,95% 2,30% 34,89% 80,93% 
11 BBNI 15,50% 2,70% 19,40% 90,40% 
12 BBRI 21,80% 3,67% 22,91% 90,50% 
13 BBTN 18,35% 1,76% 20,34% 102,66% 
14 BBYB 14,70% 2,53% 21,38% 95,74% 
15 BCIC -65,76% -5,02% 15,28% 96,33% 





17 BEKS -83,79% -9,58% 13,22% 83,85% 
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20 BJBR 21,81% 2,22% 18,43% 86,70% 
21 BJTM 17,82% 2,98% 23,88% 90,48% 
22 BKSW -31,96% -3,34% 16,46% 94,54% 
23 BMAS 7,62% 1,67% 24,32% 99,88% 
24 BMRI 11,12% 1,95% 21,36% 85,86% 
25 BNBA 6,43% 1,52% 25,15% 79,03% 
26 BNGA 6,46% 1,09% 17,96% 98,38% 
27 BNII 11,85% 1,60% 16,77% 88,92% 
28 BNLI -38,30% 4,90% 15,60% 80,50% 
29 BSIM 21,90% 2,81% 15,32% 96,66% 
30 BWSD -64,14% -11,15% 34,50% 82,70% 
31 BTPN 12,60% 3,10% 25,00% 95,00% 
32 BTPS 31,71% 8,98% 23,80% 86,27% 
33 BVIC 4,79% 0,52% 24,58% 68,38% 
34 DNAR -8,98% -1,82% 77,76% 390,12% 
35 INPC 2,11% 0,35% 19,92% 86,39% 
36 MAYA 19,00% 2,03% 13,34% 91,40% 
37 MCOR 1,16% 0,69% 19,43% 86,43% 





39 NISP 9,85% 1,85% 18,28% 89,86% 
40 NOBU 2,40% 0,53% 26,18% 53,00% 
41 PNBN 8,29% 1,69% 20,49% 94,37% 
42 PNBS 1,76% 0,37% 18,17% 90,70% 
43 SDRA 13,06% 1,93% 17,20% 110,45% 
 
2017 
No Name ROE ROA CAR LDR 
1 AGRO 5,64% 1,45% 29,58% 88,33% 
2 AGRS -1,61% -0,20% 18,64% 84,46% 
3 AMAR 0,87% 0,79% 84,86% 95,65% 
4 ARTO -6,28% -1,48% 21,04% 72,68% 
5 BABP -48,91% -7,47% 12,58% 78,78% 
6 BACA 7,17% 0,79% 22,56% 50,61% 
7 BBCA 19,20% 3,90% 23,20% 78,20% 
8 BBHI 2,74% 0,69% 19,60% 99,74% 
9 BBKP 1,85% 0,09% 10,52% 81,34% 
10 BBMD 9,55% 3,19% 34,68% 81,02% 
11 BBNI 15,60% 2,70% 18,50% 85,60% 
12 BBRI 20,03% 3,69% 22,96% 88,13% 
13 BBTN 18,11% 1,71% 18,87% 103,13% 





15 BCIC 8,09% 0,80% 14,15% 88,87% 
16 BDMN 10,50% 3,10% 22,10% 93,30% 
17 BEKS -15,43% -1,43% 10,22% 91,95% 
18 BGTB 3,02% 0,36% 14,18% 85,55% 
19 BINA 1,86% 0,82% 66,43% 77,61% 
20 BJBR 20,05% 2,01% 18,77% 87,27% 
21 BJTM 17,43% 3,12% 24,65% 79,69% 
22 BKSW -26,95% -3,72% 20,30% 70,37% 
23 BMAS 6,30% 1,60% 21,59% 97,14% 
24 BMRI 14,53% 2,72% 21,64% 87,16% 
25 BNBA 6,96% 1,73% 25,67% 82,10% 
26 BNGA 8,34% 1,70% 18,60% 96,24% 
27 BNII 9,91% 1,48% 17,53% 88,12% 
28 BNLI 4,80% 0,60% 18,10% 87,50% 
29 BSIM 7,51% 1,26% 18,31% 80,57% 
30 BWSD -12,59% -3,39% 37,17% 67,78% 
31 BTPN 8,20% 2,10% 24,60% 96,20% 
32 BTPS 36,50% 11,20% 28,90% 92,50% 
33 BVIC 5,52% 0,64% 18,17% 70,25% 
34 DNAR 1,92% 0,95% 98,28% 366,97% 
35 INPC 1,71% 0,31% 17,44% 82,89% 





37 MCOR 2,46% 0,54% 15,75% 79,49% 
38 MEGA 11,66% 2,24% 24,11% 56,47% 
39 NISP 10,66% 1,96% 17,51% 93,42% 
40 NOBU 2,68% 0,48% 26,83% 51,57% 
41 PNBN 7,49% 1,61% 22,08% 96,39% 
42 PNBS -94,01% -10,77% 11,51% 86,95% 
43 SDRA 14,21% 2,37% 24,86% 111,07% 
 
2018 
No Name ROE ROA CAR LDR 
1 AGRO 5,80% 1,54% 28,34% 86,73% 
2 AGRS -5,84% -0,77% 15,63% 84,46% 
3 AMAR 3,45% 1,59% 42,43% 132,46% 
4 ARTO -19,61% -2,76% 18,63% 76,74% 
5 BABP 5,43% 0,74% 16,27% 88,64% 
6 BACA 8,46% 0,90% 18,66% 51,96% 
7 BBCA 18,80% 4,00% 23,40% 81,60% 
8 BBHI -31,89% -5,06% 16,85% 94,19% 
9 BBKP 1,85% 0,09% 10,57% 81,34% 
10 BBMD 9,55% 2,96% 86,93% 34,58% 
11 BBNI 16,10% 2,80% 18,50% 88,80% 





13 BBTN 14,93% 1,34% 18,21% 103,25% 
14 BBYB -22,73% -2,83% 19,42% 107,66% 
15 BCIC -29,13% -2,25% 14,03% 77,43% 
16 BDMN 10,60% 3,10% 22,20% 95,00% 
17 BEKS 26,77% -1,57% 10,04% 82,86% 
18 BGTB 0,51% 0,60% 31,85% 87,81% 
19 BINA 0,97% 0,50% 55,03% 69,28% 
20 BJBR 18,81% 1,71% 18,63% 91,89% 
21 BJTM 17,75% 2,96% 24,21% 66,57% 
22 BKSW 0,42% 0,12% 26,50% 72,59% 
23 BMAS 6,35% 1,54% 21,28% 100,87% 
24 BMRI 16,23% 3,17% 20,96% 95,46% 
25 BNBA 6,81% 1,77% 25,52% 84,26% 
26 BNGA 9,09% 1,85% 19,66% 97,18% 
27 BNII 10,21% 1,74% 19,04% 96,46% 
28 BNLI 5,00% 0,80% 19,40% 90,10% 
29 BSIM 1,12% 0,25% 17,60% 84,24% 
30 BWSD 0,94% 0,24% 39,46% 99,48% 
31 BTPN 12,40% 3,10% 25,30% 96,20% 
32 BTPS 30,80% 12,40% 40,90% 95,60% 
33 BVIC 3,41% 0,33% 16,73% 73,61% 





35 INPC 1,43% 0,27% 19,80% 77,18% 
36 MAYA 5,75% 0,73% 15,82% 91,83% 
37 MCOR 4,31% 0,86% 15,69% 88,35% 
38 MEGA 13,76% 2,47% 22,79% 67,23% 
39 NISP 11,78% 2,10% 17,63% 93,51% 
40 NOBU 23,26% 0,42% 3,39% 75,35% 
41 PNBN 9,23% 2,16% 23,33% 104,15% 
42 PNBS 1,45% 0,26% 23,15% 88,82% 










Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistic 
 
 
Table 4.2 Kolmogorov Smirnov before transformation 













Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 2,909 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 
a. Test distribution is Normal. 




                   Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Y 129 -.940 .365 .03376 .195988 
X 129 0 1 .60 .491 
Z1 129 -.112 .124 .00942 .030828 
Z2 129 .034 1.257 .24917 .170514 
Z3 129 .241 7.615 .95527 .710172 





Table 4.3 Kolmogorov Smirnov after transformation 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 












Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1,055 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,216 
a. Test distribution is Normal. 
b. Calculated from data. 
 
 

































































Table 4.9 t test 
 
